Since early 2016, the word ‘warfare’ has been used in a more traditional sense — with the ‘hybrid’ adjective no longer implied. The regular participants of major economic fora note that a new sentiment has been gathering momentum — the unacknowledged desire of the political elites to cut the Gordian knot and wipe the slate clean to write a more readable script.

After the confrontations of the XX century, it was perceived as a great victory that the global order was shaped without an actual clash of arms, as compared to the times when the parties used to have it out on the battlefield. Twenty five years has passed.

Now it turns out that what we then perceived as a finale didn’t really get things straight. Today we’ve reached a crucial point that is in many ways rather unique.

The dawning of a new era

The time is gone when everyone assumed that the end of the Cold War meant the onset of a new order, that a new hierarchy had been established to be subsequently finalized as a system of institutions, some of them new, others adjusted to the changed environment.

The stabilization was not to be, though throughout the first decade of the ‘new era’ (in 1991 – 2001, nominally from the breakup of the Soviet Union to the attacks of 9/11) the general outline of the unipolar world seemed to have been set.

The second decade (2001 to 2011, from the incursion into Afghanistan to the civil war in Syria) was marked by a series of attempts to reinforce unipolarity which resulted in a rapid erosion of the existing perceptions and further exacerbation of the destructive processes.

We are now heading towards the middle of the third decade, and are witnessing the definitive collapse of the old system (the Cold War model that failed to adjust itself to the realities of the post-Cold War era) and what appears to be the outlines of a new world order beginning to take shape.

So what are the most important international processes that have defined the development of the world system in the 2010s, that have and will influence Russia’s current and future position? They are as follows:

• The crisis of the European Union and that fact that having lost its international influence it has focused on internal problems and attempts at transformation;

• The actual collapse of the old order in the Middle East and its turning — for many years and maybe decades to come — into a zone of increased instability;

• The shift of international geopolitical and economic activity towards Asia. The changed role of China, and, consequently, entire geometry of the relations in the region;

• Increased international attention to Eurasia against the backdrop of its attempts (through independent from one another, but to a certain degree coordinated strategies of Russia and China) to obtain integrity and acquire international personality;

• The beginning of a new rearrangement of the global economic regulation system through the formation of mega-blocs;

• The US starting to revise their strategic approaches.

The decline of “Greater Europe”

The concept of Greater Europe was in many respects intended as the core of the much-expected world order that failed to take form when the Cold War was over, and the fate of this core is rather illustrative in terms of general processes. The result of the end of the Cold War, “Greater Europe” was an ideological notion rather than a geographical one. More precisely, it implied rapidly overcoming the European geopolitical divide, creating a single space of security and sustainable development based on the model of the European Community/Union with NATO’s dominating role in the sphere of security. Today both of these institutes that were to become a backbone of the “new Europe” are in a crisis.

Apart from failing to become a major and independent international player, the European Union has witnessed the defeat of its policy in relation to the neighbouring states. The Eastern Partnership brought about the crisis in Ukraine, the Union for the Mediterranean was totally paralyzed by the Arab Spring and the subsequent developments. The strategic partnership with Russia ended up in a sanctions war. This is how things stand now, in early 2016.

The attempts to stand up as equals with the United States boiled down to negotiations on creating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership under the US auspices. Each specific crisis, regardless of its cause, be it the euro-related issues or the migrant crisis, tends to turn into a structural crisis for the European institutions.

Since the USSR ceased to be, the NATO has failed to find a clear and well-defined mission. The Ukrainian crisis and the accession of Crimea to Russia made it appear that the model of the Cold War may well be brought back, which meant consolidating against a known enemy, the old familiar one. However, even at the height of the crisis in Ukraine, NATO was far from unanimous. The conflict in Syria, and especially the escalation of tensions following the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey, put the question point blank as to the solidarity inside Alliance. In the times of the Cold War one could hardly imagine a situation when a member state takes serious military actions without consulting its allies. These days, a state may act hotheadedly at its own peril and then turn for support to its allies, who may happen to have a different view of the situation.

The rise of “Greater Eurasia”

The emergence of “Greater Eurasia” is an important process. In East Asia, China has faced increasing pressure and resistance of the United States and their allies. This is one of the reasons why Beijing has turned towards the west, to Eurasia, which is making a difference for the region. The Eurasian continent, including its western end, is becoming more integral and interconnected.

The fact that since 1991 Russia had not been included as equal in the rearrangement processes both in Europe and globally gave rise to a sense of inferiority and a desire to secure an independent place for itself. The decline of the European Union combined with growth in China and Asia at large are gradually starting to influence Russia’s identity and have enhanced its ambition to fit into the Asian trends. Admittedly, the process has been slow and ineffective, but nothing suggests that it is going to stop soon. Due to the fact that the influence in Ukraine was lost, the Eurasian integration project — that initially was Eurasian in name only, while in the essence it was an attempt to create a second pole of the “European world” — has been gradually developing truly Eurasian features. The effect only deepens as China intensifies its activity in Eurasia.

At this moment it is hard to predict how the relations between Russia and China will evolve, given the changed situation. Russia’s dramatic turn towards the PRC at the height of the Ukrainian crisis resulted in a brief spell of euphoria, which rapidly faded as the objective issues attributable to cultural and ideological differences became apparent.

Meanwhile, the expectations that competition between Russia and China cannot be avoided, primarily, in Central Asia, do not appear so evident. Their interests and possibilities in this part of Eurasia are quite compatible. China admittedly has much greater capabilities in the economic sphere. However, the more it invests in the region, the more it will be interested in preserving stability and security. No other state except Russia is ready and able to provide such services. Besides, China, who has faced increased tensions along its borders, will definitely appreciate a stable and constructive neighbour.

However, the adjustment of interests of Russia and China will be a long and painful process, and its rapidity will also depend on how the relations will develop between Beijing and Washington and how the competition will evolve. There has been increased evidence that the competition may be indeed expected to grow.

 

Russia:
between global projects

Basically, Russia is stuck between two projects. Such a position has its advantages, since each of the projects is only in the making, and it would be premature to take a definite approach to any of them. However, it is impossible to leave the question on one’s own position unanswered for a long time — this is a fact that Russia’s leadership understands pretty well, judging by the country’s recently intensified effort in the international field.

Russia has failed to hold together the rapidly-coming-apart post-Soviet space that Moscow has perceived as a natural and lawful sphere of interests. Throughout the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the unquestioned priority was to preserve the dominance in its former territory, and much effort was put into achieving this goal. Yet, the disintegration continued.

And here we come to a paradox.

As the failure of Russia’s strategy in the former Soviet Union became apparent, and the costs increased quite dramatically (the Ukrainian crisis), Moscow’s competitors were becoming progressively less interested in the “disputed assets”. The attempts to “refine” almost any of the states in the post-Soviet space would be too costly for any bidder. Unfortunately, the decreased interest spells a considerably lower level of predictability rather than heralds a termination of rivalry and the onset of stabilization. The countries in transition get stuck outside of serious development projects which leads to internal shocks, though all the while these countries continue to arouse the instincts of rivalry in their more powerful neighbours. The latter (primarily Russia and the EU) indeed follow a negative agenda — to prevent the rivals from getting hold of the “grey zone” states.

By comparison, China follows a different logic. It has made every effort to distance itself from any kind of politics attending only to the economical projects that are in line with its strategy that has been shaped into the ideology of the “New Silk Road”. Beijing’s position is that it would not assume the responsibility for the states en-route.

Due to certain peculiarities of its development in the post-Soviet period, to position itself in the international field Russia has opted for the military muscle that has been restored to some extent, and — which is more relevant — for the preparedness to use it.

The operation in Syria that started last autumn meant entering a principally new phase of military force ambitions. Reliance on military force has been aggravated by the general increase of internal and interstate conflicts. Such a situation upsets the EU’s basic assumption that military force as leverage is becoming a thing of the past and is being replaced by other ways of competition, primarily economic ones.

The US/Russia factor

Meanwhile, the events of the recent two years have shown that, contrary to the expectations, the political motivation behind specific actions fully overrides the requirements of cost-effectiveness. The Turkey case may be a vivid example in this respect.

An important factor to influence Russia’s perception of the prospects for global and national development is some sort of a state of strategic confusion in which the United States apparently is at the moment. It is usually attributed to the specific features of President Barack Obama’s temper as a politician and a personality, which indeed may well be the case. However, in addition to the personal element, objective processes also should be factored in.

Mr. Obama’s presidency is also a transitional period (just as the entire global development) — from the US claims to single-handed and unquestionable leadership to a world order that is more diversified in terms of both distribution of power and the instruments to exercise this power. At this point it is hard to say which direction will be the choice of the new president who is to be elected in 2016. The rising suspense of the presidential primaries suggests that the nation is disappointed with the ruling elite and wants a change. A strategic U-turn may hardly be expected this year, though its vectors are quite visible. There may be an attempt to go back to the approaches of the 1990s, to show that the US hegemony is the only option. However, it is equally likely that the US will opt for further selectivity, which would mean that the priorities will be identified more accurately and sparingly.

Judging by its recent actions Russia intends to use the moment of the US reflection (as a manifestation of the country’s desire to review the methods of its global policy) to — at least to some extent — fill the niches that are de-facto being vacated by Washington. In particular, certain withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East has offered a possibility for Russia to increase its influence in the region that has been central for global politics. In addition, for Moscow it is an opportunity to expand the agenda in its dialogue with the Western counties that has been totally dominated by Ukraine in the recent two years, forcing Russia to stick to regional issues.

As Russia’s policy becomes more active, the imbalance between the country’s willingness to play a leading role on the global scale and the state of its economic base, of its share in the global economy, becomes increasingly evident. The risk of overstretching itself becomes more than just a risk. The intention to compensate the lack of capabilities with the determination to use military force may be effective only to a certain extent.

One of the factors behind further “raising the bar” has been the not-unfounded perception that the enemies are vulnerable and dismayed, though the degree of their vulnerability and dismay is probably overestimated.

The relations between Russia and the Western states have entered a phase of a long crisis, that is further aggravated not only and not so much by a difference in values and policies, as by a mutual conviction that the counterpart is vulnerable and short-lived. Consequently, there is a risk of asymmetric confrontation. As it happened before, the tragedies related to terrorist attacks are followed by an outburst of enthusiasm to stand up together against a global threat.

However, given the overall level of mistrust between the countries, we may hardly expect them to unite against terrorism or form any sort of a coalition. Certain cooperation will be possible, most likely in the technical sphere. The agreement between Russia and the United States on joint action to achieve a cease-fire in Syria and kick off the process of political settlement was an unexpected example of a constructive approach. Unfortunately, apart from this fact, the relations are what they are.

In the case of asymmetric confrontation, where each of the parties both realizes its own vulnerability and sees the chink in the opponent’s armour, the two countries will try to make full use of their own strengths. Russia’s strength is its rather combat-capable army. In a situation where there are efficient military capabilities and, most importantly, the willingness to use it, there is a temptation to make them your instrument of choice

Mega-blocs and mega problems

At the same time, in a new world the regulatory and legal dictate will probably play an even greater role than military force. The prototype of such type of government is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an association under the aegis of the US. Though the TPP has very little influence on Russia’s economy, due to the fact that it hardly has any connection to the Asia-Pacific Region, it is rather important as a prototype. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that is being formed following this model will influence Russia’s economy to a greater degree. If successful, the TTIP will unite North America and the EU. Then the European Union — still our largest partner — will be part of an area governed by the rules that are laid without Russia’s participation.

The fragmentation of the world into economic mega-blocs that is currently underway is drawing a line under the time of universally-applied economic rules symbolized by the World Trade Organization. Ironically enough, Russia who has joined the WTO after 18 years of negotiations after it had bargained quite favourable terms for itself, has, in point of fact, come after the feast. Now it will have to adapt to a new system of global economic governance.

The fragmentation of the economic space and its division into blocs raises the question on the relations between groups of states that are united by common but still not universal rules. In a world like that, measures of mutual restriction that we are used to call ‘sanctions’ may become a standard practice in the relations between the states or blocs, where — if only for the purpose of achieving this balance ad hoc — the countries will have to regulate the activities of each other with such methods. It looks like we might as well start to get accustomed to the fact that they will be applied and become standard practice.

The major challenges that Russia now faces are not limited to diversifying its economy (the need to do so appears evident). They also include understanding what is essentially power and strength. If we go down the road of absolutizing the kind of power that is currently Russia’s strength, it will lead us to serious problems. The results of such a policy will follow very quickly: in the modern world, things are really fast